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1 – 10 of 19Christian Belzil, Michael Bognanno and François Poinas
This chapter estimates a dynamic reduced-form model of intra-firm promotions using an employer–employee panel of over 300 of the largest corporations in the United States in the…
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This chapter estimates a dynamic reduced-form model of intra-firm promotions using an employer–employee panel of over 300 of the largest corporations in the United States in the period from 1981 to 1988. The estimation conditions on unobserved individual heterogeneity and allows for both an endogenous initial condition and sample attrition linked to individual heterogeneity in demonstrating the relative importance of variables that influence promotion. The role of the executive’s functional area in promotion is considered along with the existence and source of promotion fast tracks. We find that while the principal determinant of promotions is unobserved individual heterogeneity, functional area has a high explanatory power, resulting in promotion probabilities that differ by functional area for executives at the same reporting level and firm. No evidence is found that an executive’s recent speed of advancement in pay grade has a positive causal impact on in-sample promotions after conditioning on the executive’s career speed of advancement, except for the lowest level executives the data. Fast tracks appear to largely result from heterogeneity in persistent individual characteristics, not from an inherent benefit in recent advancement itself.
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Otis W. Gilley and Marc C. Chopin
Although most labor and microeconomic textbooks contain a theoretical discussion of the backward‐bending labor supply curve, scant empirical evidence of this phenomenon exists. In…
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Although most labor and microeconomic textbooks contain a theoretical discussion of the backward‐bending labor supply curve, scant empirical evidence of this phenomenon exists. In this paper we investigate the behavior of PGA golf professionals as they make labor‐leisure choices for performing on the PGA Tour. Using tournament theory to model this labor market and data from tournament performances over three seperate years, we find significant evidence that higher paid PGA Tour players do indeed operate in the backward‐bending region of their labor supply curves.
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Marc C. Chopin and Craig T. Schulman
Analysis of management compensation has focused on the principal — agent problem. We address the problem confronting owners who must choose a manager without knowing the…
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Analysis of management compensation has focused on the principal — agent problem. We address the problem confronting owners who must choose a manager without knowing the productivity of individual managers. We find performance contingent contracts may result in a separating equilibrium in which high productivity managers accept contracts low productivity managers find unacceptable.
Michael Bognanno and Lisa Delgado
The costs of job displacement are examined on a sample of Japanese workers successfully provided job placement services from 2000 to 2003, a period of economic stagnation and…
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The costs of job displacement are examined on a sample of Japanese workers successfully provided job placement services from 2000 to 2003, a period of economic stagnation and structural change in Japan. We find that displaced workers suffer a loss of approximately $1,100 for each additional year of age. Workers also incur a large penalty when they change industries after being displaced. The age–earnings loss relationship is consistent with the operation of a delayed compensation scheme in large firms.
Christian Belzil and Michael Bognanno
We formulate static and dynamic empirical models of promotion where the current promotion probability depends on the hierarchical level in the firm, individual human capital…
Abstract
We formulate static and dynamic empirical models of promotion where the current promotion probability depends on the hierarchical level in the firm, individual human capital, unobserved individual specific attributes, time-varying firm-specific variables, as well as endogenous past promotion histories (in the dynamic version). Within the static versions, we investigate the relative influence of the key determinants of promotions and how these influences vary by hierarchical levels. In the dynamic version of the model, we examine the causal effect of past speed of promotion on promotion outcomes. The model is fit on an eight-year panel of 30,000 American executives employed in more than 300 different firms. The stochastic process generating promotions may be viewed as a series of promotion probabilities which become smaller as an individual moves up in the hierarchy and which are primarily explained by unobserved heterogeneity and promotion opportunities. Firm variables and observed human capital variables (age, tenure, and education) play a surprisingly small role. We also find that, conditional on unobservables, the promotion probability is only enhanced by the speed of promotion achieved in the past (a structural fast track effect) for a subset of the population and is negative for the majority. In general, the magnitude of the individual-specific effect of past speed of promotion is inversely related to schooling, tenure, and hierarchical level.
Solomon W. Polachek and Konstantinos Tatsiramos
Early models of the functional distribution of income assume constant labor productivity among all individuals. Not until human capital theory developed did scholars take into…
Abstract
Early models of the functional distribution of income assume constant labor productivity among all individuals. Not until human capital theory developed did scholars take into account how productivity varied across workers. According to early human capital models, this variation came about because each individual invested differently in education and training. Those acquiring greater amounts of schooling and on-the-job training earned more. However, these models neglected why one person would get training while another would not. One explanation is individual heterogeneity. Some individuals are smarter, some seek risk, some have time preferences for the future over the present, some simply are lucky by being in the right place at the right time, and some are motivated by the pay incentives of the jobs they are in. This volume contains 10 chapters, each dealing with an aspect of earnings. Of these, the first three deal directly with earnings distribution, the next four with job design and remuneration, the next two with discrimination, and the final chapter with wage rigidities in the labor market.
Solomon W. Polachek and Konstantinos Tatsiramos
Who works, how much one works, and what one earns are the cornerstones of labor economics. However, determining the answers to these questions can be tricky because many factors…
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Who works, how much one works, and what one earns are the cornerstones of labor economics. However, determining the answers to these questions can be tricky because many factors are involved in estimating labor supply, explaining the implications of labor demand, and determining the resulting earnings. This volume contains 13 chapters on these components of the labor market. Five deal directly with labor supply; four deal with labor demand, most notably the effect of cyclical demand fluctuations; and the remaining four deal with compensation, particularly wages, wage distributions, and fringe benefits.